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This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to identify strategic groups (SGs) in the Spanish banking indus-
try. The concept of SG relies on the fact that firms grouped together value inputs and outputs in the same way. As such,
they take identical direction when, due to external influences, changes are required. Weights obtained from DEA are
extremely useful in the valuation of inputs and outputs. Specifically, by comparing DEA weights pair-wise, i.e. quan-
tifying the variables marginal rates (MR), we can obtain a very good representation of the existent trade-off and the
relative importance of the two variables.
The paper uses MRs obtained through DEA models and, simultaneously, proposes feasible ways to overcome two
usual problems with DEA virtual weights, namely: (1) the multiplicity of weights for efficient DMUs; and (2) the inex-
istence of dual variables for inefficient DMUs.
From the empirical point of view, once the MRs are determined, the second stage is to perform Cluster Analysis. We
apply Cluster Analysis in two ways: (1) on the basis of the MRs; and (2) following the traditional application by run-
ning Cluster Analysis with the original variables. The results obtained show the advantages of using MRs instead of the
standard application of Cluster Analysis.
Summing up, the concept of SG is reinforced if we use refined methods to determine the existence of SGs. The results
of the application of DEA models to observe the presence of SG in the Spanish banking industry offer interesting views
on it.
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o1. Introduction
To manage organizations, knowledge of the im
plicit trade offs among the activities is necessary.
For example, to increase the production of a spe
cific output, organisations must know how much
additional quantity of a necessary input is re
quired, or how much one input (output) should in
crease when another input (output) decreases. This
reasoning, taken from production theory, can also
be applied when examining the choice of competi
tive strategy made by a firm. For example, Porter
(1980), when defining generic strategies of differen
tiation and costs leadership, states that a firms
current trade offs indicate its capacity to adapt to
new competitive market conditions.
In fact, according to Porter (1979, p. 215), the
concept of trade off is already implicit in the very
definition of a strategic group (henceforth an
SG). Thus, it is assumed that all firms that are in
the same SG will respond to a disturbance is sim
ilar ways, given that their costs of change in strat
egy are very similar. Similarly, Hatten and Hatten
(1987) make it very clear that the cost of a change
in strategy within a SG is different from the rest of
the SGs in the industry.
Pursuing this viewpoint, this study introduces
an alternative approach of assigning firms to
SGs: firms are classified according to their capacity
to respond to disturbances, where capacity to re
spond to disturbances is defined as the trade offs
among key decision variables. In fact, the main
motivation of this paper is to demonstrate that
the traditional focus of the SG literature, which
groups firms according to their similarities in key
strategic dimensions, can be surpassed.
In our application, we have found the taxon
omy proposed by Cool and Schendel (1987) to
be very useful in the key variables selection proc
ess. Cool and Schendel classify the strategic varia
bles into scope and resource commitments
variables. Later, this classification turns out to be
of great help in the use of the non parametric,
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models to
determine the response capacity of each strategic
group.
The initial DEA model was proposed by Char
nes et al. (1978). A DEA model performs comparsons among organisations (referred to as decision
aking units, DMUs), which use similar composi
ions of inputs to obtain similar compositions of
utputs. In our case, the DMUs are banking firms,
he inputs are resource commitments and the
utputs are dimensions of scope. The result is the
onstruction of an empirical frontier, the configu
ation of which is defined by different firms sharing
he same commitment of resources in order to
each the maximum scope; i.e. to participate in a
reater number of market segments, to offer a
reater number of products in these markets, or
o extend the geographic reach of its strategy. If
firm lies on the frontier (say, there is no other
MU producing more outputs by consuming
qual or lower inputs), it is labelled a strategic lea
er (SL). If not, it is a strategic follower (SF).
EA provides efficiency scores, and for SFs a set
f peers that are obtained by projecting them on
o the frontier. The efficiency score indicates the
ercentage by which a SF should increase its out
uts in order to become efficient, i.e. become an
L. Reference units are hypothetical DMUs on
he efficient frontier regarded as target units for
Fs.
There exists a broad research stream using
EA models to evaluate efficiency in banking
see, for instance, Grifell Tatje and Lovell, 1997,
r Pastor et al., 1997). However, as far as we
now, previous literature using the DEA method
logy to determine strategic groups is truly scarce.
ay et al. (1994, 1995) reveal the indubitable
dvantages of this technique. In particular, they
ighlight the capacity to consider multiple outputs
r the establishment of a nexus between inputs and
utput when firms pursue multiple objectives.
heir proposal is valuable because it introduces a
lear and objective criterion for identifying strate
ic groups. It does, however, suffer from severe
imitations: depending on the line segment to
hich they are projected, two practically identical
rms can end up being classified in different SGs.
This paper applies DEA to identify strategic
roups, but in another direction. To us, a SG is
set of firms that are similar because of the way
hey value inputs and outputs. This shifts the
mphasis to the determination of weights. Thus,
ur proposal consists of grouping together firms
according to similarities in their relative valuation
of key decision variables (the trade offs between
the relative weights). However, there are two tech
nical problems that must be addressed first. First,
for each efficient firm there is not just one but a
multiple number of weights that could be used.
Second, for DMUs that do not form part of the
frontier, the weights are undefined. The latter
problem arises from microeconomic theory.
This paper is organised as follows. Besides this
introduction, there are five remaining sections.
Section 2 gives an analysis of the theoretical foun
dations of the SGs and closes with a proposal that
helps to resolve the problems that arise when Clus
ter Analysis is used directly to establish SGs. In
Section 3, a variant of the non parametric DEA
models is developed to determine the existing
trade offs between each pair of strategic variables.
Section 4 is methodological: it comprises a descrip
tion of the sample, the strategic decision variables
and the selection of marginal rates required to
determine the presence of SGs in the banking
industry. The results of the empirical application
are reported in Section 5. The article ends with a
synthesis of the principal conclusions.2. The strategic group concept: Multi-dimensionality and causality of the strategy
The concept of SG was introduced by Hunt in
1972, although it was later contributions (namely
Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979) defined the
principal elements of the theory. According to Por
ter (1979), the concept of the SG serves to distin
guish a group of firms with similar strategies
that, in turn, are different from those followed by
other firms in the same industry. Thus, the strate
gic decisions made by a firm within an SG cannot
be imitated by firms outside the group without
substantial costs (monetary, time or uncertainty
about the outcome of such decisions). Accord
ingly, the existence of SGs requires the existence
of barriers to imitation (Caves and Porter, 1977;
Porter, 1979). These group specific entry barriers,
the so called ‘‘barriers to mobility’’, give protec
tion to group members, and explain why some
firms obtain positive economic benefits fromadopting intra group strategies while others do
not. Without such barriers, successful strategies
could be imitated quickly, resulting in loss of per
formance differentials (Porter, 1979). From this
viewpoint, mobility barriers could be interpreted
as the penalty costs of moving from one SG to an
other: high mobility barriers mean the expected
costs of any attempt to change group membership
are high, which leads to lower expected profitabil
ity. This eliminates the incentives to change among
SGs and deters entry into groups (Hatten and Hat
ten, 1987).
Obviously, there is a price to pay for changing
strategies; and the more dissimilar a strategy is,
the more it will cost to imitate it. Hence, firms
in the same group will find it less costly to behave
like the rest of the group members. In contrast,
barriers to mobility between groups imply that
non members suffer a high cost for copying the
strategies of the group to which they do not be
long. Consequently, each SG comprises firms fol
lowing similar strategies about key variables.
This also concurs with the definition by McGee
and Thomas (1986) of an SG as a group of firms
responding in the same way to environmental dis
turbances. The result of this homogeneity is that a
specific strategic dimension acquires increasing
importance while other dimensions have decreas
ing importance. In contrast, when we compare
firms forming part of different SGs, the barriers
(the costs of imitation) depend upon the relative
circumstances of each firm, as costs functions
may be asymmetric (Hatten and Hatten, 1987).
It follows from the previous discussion that a
strategic group can be defined as a set of firms that
organize themselves in the same way and react in a
unified way to the same external influences. This is,
precisely, the definition of SG we are interested in
utilizing throughout the paper.
Basically, the SG framework relies on barriers
to mobility to account for persistent intra industry
performance variation (Porter, 1979). Although
the existing literature has had relative success in
the identification of groups of firms with different
strategies (i.e., dissimilarities in the collective
behavior between groups), no conclusive empirical
evidence exists for the hypothesized group per
formance linkage (McGee and Thomas, 1986;
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pThomas and Venkatraman, 1988; Barney and
Hoskisson, 1990). There are two possible explana
tions for the weak empirical evidence on the per
formance implications associated with group
membership. One possibility is that the relation
ship has not been captured adequately (due to
poor specification of the model). The other possi
bility is simply that no such linkage exists (see,
for instance, the work of Hatten and Hatten,
1987, who assume the concept of SG exists as an
analytical convenience). Being more optimistic
than Hatten and Hatten, and assuming that SG
is something more than a methodological artifact,
the literature identifies to two essential problems.
First, there has been limited progress towards an
acceptable definition of the concept of SG (Cool
and Schendel, 1987). Recently, this lack of pro
gress has led to the suggestion of new theoretical
approaches to define SG such as, for example,
the cognitive perspective (see Fombrun and Zajac,
1987) or the resource determinants of performance
differences (see Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Mehra,
1996). The second problem identified is that the
methodology for treating the data is inadequate
(Ketchen and Shook, 1996); and the habitual use
of Cluster Analysis is criticised (Thomas and Ven
katraman, 1988; Barney and Hoskisson, 1990).
Day et al. (1994, 1995) illustrate the crucial weak
ness of this technique by showing that when firms
are designing strategies; in fact, managers cognise
a causal model (i.e. a transformation function)
relating, in a more or less conscious manner, oper
ational decisions with the attainment of an objec
tive function. Furthermore, Day et al. (1994,
1995) report that firms are typically driven by mul
tiple goals: not just profit maximization. There
fore, Cluster Analysis is an inadequate technique
because (i) it does not capture the multidimensio
nality of strategy; (ii) it does not take into account
the relative importance of the key decision varia
bles (Hatten and Hatten, 1987); and (iii) because
it does not allow the incorporation the inherent
causality of the definition of strategy (Thomas
and Venkatraman, 1988).
From the discussion of the literature below, it is
our belief that (a) it is necessary to identify the
causal model which helps to identify the character
istics of the transformation function between thetrategic variables; (b) it is important to know
he relative weights of the key decision variables
i.e., the trade offs between the variables) in order
o test the existence of mobility barriers among dif
erent SGs; and finally (c) it is beneficial to identify
he strategic leaders (DMUs forming the frontier)
nd strategic followers (DMUs that are inefficient,
espite forming part of the same SG).
Given this conception of SG, the next section
xplains how to use DEA models in order to. Using DEA to assess response ability
Here, we attempt to eliminate the limitations
aised in the previous section by using DEA mod
ls. Our final goal is the proposition of a three stage
rocess, which tries to avoid the direct Cluster
nalysis of the original variables. In the first stage,
EA is used to assess the degree of efficiency of
ach firm, allowing each firm to convert inputs into
utputs autonomously. DEA efficiency scores are
btained by radially projecting all DMUs on to
he frontier. A firm lying on the frontier is efficient.
uch a firm is, as mentioned earlier, so called a
strategic leader’’, or SL. Otherwise, the DMU is
efficient and is thus a ‘‘strategic follower’’, or
F. In the latter case, the efficiency score quantify
he percentage by which the SF should increase
roportionally all its outputs in order to become
fficient. In the second stage, the relative impor
ance of the variables (trade offs) is computed. Fi
ally, Cluster Analysis of the trade offs is then
mployed to identify the strategic groups.
Let us begin with the most standard DEA
odel (Charnes et al., 1978). Consider a set of S
r = 1, . . . , S) firms, each of which individually
roduces M (i = 1, . . . ,M) different outputs for
everal markets or segments in which it parti
ipates (in Section 4 the output variables are
esignated as variables of scope) having commit
ed N (j = 1, . . . , N) different resources. Let X/
= xj/)j 1,. . .,N and Y/ (= yi/)i 1,. . .,M denote the in
ut and output vectors for DMU /. From this, the
fficiency (in our case, competitive advantage) of
rm /, h/, can be evaluated through the following
rogram (the so called CCR model):
Max
ui;vj
h/ ¼
XM
i 1
uiyi/
XN
j 1
vjxj/
, !
s:t:
XM
i 1
uiyir
XN
j 1
vjxjr
, !
6 1; r ¼ 1; . . . ; S;
ui
XM
i 1
uiyif
, !
P e; i ¼ 1; . . . ;M ;
vj
XN
j 1
vjxjf
, !
P e; j ¼ 1; . . . ;N ;
ð1Þ
where vj and ui are the input and output weights or
multipliers (taken as relative or shadow prices).
For the DMU under evaluation (/), program (1)
chooses the weights combination that maximizes
its efficiency, which is the weighted ratio of outputs
to inputs. The constraints guarantee that the effi
ciency score h/ will not be greater than unity (max
imum efficiency level), and that the virtual prices
are, necessarily, non negative.
The CCR model constructs a piecewise linear
envelopment surface (i.e., an empirical frontier)
in RMþNþ , which can be described in terms of its
defining facets. The optimal weights that solve
program (1) are the coefficients of the linear equa
tions that describe these facets. In this sense, vj
and ui yield a facet of the frontier to DMU /:
XM
i 1
ui yi/
XN
j 1
vj xj/ ¼ 0:
From this, the production possibility set can be
described in terms of (1) the marginal rate of sub
stitution between inputs (MRS), (2) the marginal
rate of transformation between outputs (MRT),
(3) the marginal productivity of outputs relative
to inputs, (4) the marginal cost of inputs relative
to outputs and (5) the elasticity of substitution
(see Rosen et al., 1998; Cooper et al., 2000).
However, when DMU / is efficient (h/ = 1), the
virtual weights may not be unique. Thus, we can
not directly use the weights obtained from (1) as
input or output shadow prices (Rosen et al.,
1998). Nevertheless, program (1) distinguishes be
tween efficient and inefficient DMUs. It is most
interesting to provide an alternative approach toweights computation: The next section is devoted
to the identification of a harmonized set of weights
for efficient DMUs.
For h/ = 1 we can say that DMU / is a strate
gic leader (SL) that lies on the frontier. When
h/ < 1, DMU / is not on the frontier and we say
that / is a strategic follower (SF). A strategic fol
lower can proportionally contract its inputs by h/,
while still producing at least the same level of
outputs.
3.1. Response capacity of strategic leaders
As has been pointed out, SG is defined here as a
set of firms that convert inputs into outputs while
placing an identical valuation on the variables.
This is why firms in the same SG will present iden
tical reactions to the same external stimuli; or, in
other words, why they present similarities in their
response capacity.
Since DEA weights reveal a firms order of pref
erences for decision variables, the importance of
weights indicates a firms relative valuation of in
puts and outputs. From this, we define response
capacity as the trade offs among weights. These
trade offs are very informative because marginal
relations between variables equal the negative in
verse of weights ratios.
Let DMU / be a SL whose decisions on the M
dimensions of scope and the virtual prices associ
ated with each one of them are labeled as, respec
tively, y1/, . . . , yM/ and u1/, . . . , uM/. The
response capacity of /, with respect to the pair
of variables yk/, yl/ (k,l 2 i), is defined by
MRT/yk ;yl ¼ oyk/=oyl/, whose value is equal to the
negative of the virtual prices, (ul//uk/). An MRT
is defined for each pair of scope dimensions so that
the total number of MRTs for a given firm is
M ·M.
The graphical analysis is portrayed in Fig. 1. As
shown, the ratio between the virtual prices uk and
ul represents the partial derivatives on the frontier.
Thus, the output weights trade off determines a
tangency point between the pricing hyperplane
and the production possibility frontier (PPF) at
point C.
Conceptually, MRTs indicate the slope of the
production possibilities frontier in each point
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the production possibility
set and the marginal rate of transformation between two
outputs.
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Fig. 2. Maximum (b) and minimum (a) marginal rates of
transformation of a strategic leader (C).(y1, . . . , yM) 2 RM. Given the assumption of linear
technology in DEA models, this implies that mul
tiple pairs of virtual prices are acceptable for all
SLs (Rosen et al., 1998; Cooper et al., 2000). Thus,
we cannot directly use the weights from program
(1).
In an attempt to find ways to order the MRTs,
Rosen et al. (1998) propose an optimization pro
gram giving the minimum MRTs (MRS) between
outputs (inputs). To see this, let us define
Z = (Y, X)T as the matrix of throughputs of all
firms; that is a single matrix that contains outputs,
Y ¼ ðyirÞi 1;...;M
r 1;...;S
, and inputs, X ¼ ðxjrÞj 1;...;N
r 1;...;S
. In this
case, the throughput vector of firm /, / 2 r,
is denoted by Z/ = (Y/, X/)
T, where Y/ =
(yi/)i 1,. . .,M and X/ = (xj/)j 1,. . .,N. Therefore,
zi+j,/ can be an input or an output. Now let us de
note the matrix of weights (for outputs and inputs,
respectively) of all firms by v = (u, v). Conse
quently, the marginal rate (MR) between the l
and k variables is defined as MRk,l  (ozk/
ozl) = (vl/vk). When zk and zl correspond to
two outputs (inputs), the MR refers to MRT
(MRS). Given the special characteristics of the
DEA frontier (continuous, but with discontinuous
derivatives at the extreme efficient points), Rosen
et al.s proposal (1998) is to compute the deriva
tives on the right and on the left, that is the mini
mum and maximum ratios of weights (or MRs) at
a point, MRþk;l and MR

k;l. To do this, they propose
to solve, for each firm on the frontier, the follow
ing programs:Rþk;l ¼ Maxv ðvl=vkÞ ðMR

k;l ¼ Minvðvl=vkÞÞ
.t. zT/v¼ 0;
zTp v6 0; ð2Þ
here v is non negative and P (P 	 r) refers to all
trategic leaders. Furthermore, when k, l are out
uts, then MR refers to the MRT between out
uts. Hence, MR+ or the derivative of output k
o output l, at a point / (/ 2 P) on the right, cor
esponds to the minimum marginal rate of trans
ormation or the absolute value of the maximum
RT (MR corresponds to the absolute value of
he maximum or the minimum). The first set of
estrictions insures that the firm is situated on
he frontier; the second set guarantees that no
ther firm has an efficiency coefficient greater than
ne.
The proposal by Rosen et al. (1998), which is
raphically portrayed in Fig. 2, is based upon the
omputation of the maximum (b) and minimum
a) slope for each vertex; that is the value for the
atio between the greater and lower virtual prices,
espectively.
In our application, we choose as MRT the value
R (the derivative of the PPF on the left) in or
er to avoid infinite values (see in Fig. 2 that the
aximum MRT of DMU C is b).
Program (2) also allows for the identification of
he virtual prices of the committed resources. With
this, we can also determine the inputs marginal
rates of substitution, MRSs. This time, to avoid
infinite values, we choose the minimum MRSs
(derivative on the left). Nevertheless, as Rosen
et al. (1998) indicate, unbounded solutions can
exist in an indeterminate number of cases. In a
similar vein, Cooper et al. (2000) point out that
some problems arise with this previous approach,
because these weights are often very small, so that
additional treatment, such as scaling, is needed.
This problem, given the multiplicity of input
output variables, assumes greater importance in
our application, especially. For this reason, we
introduce a new set of constraints on program
(2), which ensures bounded weights. See in
Appendix A how we propose to sort this problem
out.Yk
C
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Fig. 3. Identification of the marginal rate of transformation of
a strategic follower (H) using interpolation.3.2. Response capacity of strategic followers
Consider now the situation of strategic follow
ers (SFs). Here problems arise because the ap
proach presented in the previous section does not
work and MRTs cannot be computed. This is
due to the fact that MRTs represent partial deriv
atives on the frontier (slopes on the PPF at partic
ular points) while SFs, as inefficient DMUs, are in
the interior of the production possibility set
(Cooper et al., 2000).
Another problem related with SFs is that vir
tual prices assigned by program (1) define an iden
tical MRT for all firms projected to the same linear
segment of the PPF. This means that these ineffi
cient firms, their respective positions vis a` vis the
frontier notwithstanding, could appear as if they
were in the same SG.
These two limitations can be resolved by using
interpolation to determine the weights of ineffi
cient DMUs. The interpolation requires two steps.
First, the dual of the linear version of program (1)
is applied in order to identify activity vectors. Sec
ond, taking the MRTs of SLs from program (A.2)
and the activity vectors from program (1), it is easy
to compute MRTs of SFs.
A more formal description of the interpolation
is presented now. First, let us consider program
(3):Max
as;k;sþ ;s
z/ ¼ a/ þ e
Xm
i 1
sþ þ e
Xn
j 1
s
s.t. a/Y /
XS
r 1
krY r þ sþ ¼ 0;
XS
r 1
krX r þ s ¼ X /;
kr; sþ; s P 0. ð3Þ
When program (3) is solved, we obtain the
activity vector k/ = [k/1, . . . , k/S]; and the effi
ciency level, z/, for each DMU / 2 r (r = 1,
. . . , S), where z/ = h/. Depending on its level of
competitive disadvantage, the activity vector k/
indicates the importance of the SL in the determi
nation of the targets for the SF.
Fig. 3 shows the graphic representation. Here,
for the inefficient firm H, the reference set com
prises the DMUs C and D. The radial distance
separating H from the frontier determines its inef
ficiency. For the given commitment of factors, firm
H could become efficient (i.e. situated on the fron
tier at point H*) by increasing all of its products a
proportionate amount of zH. In effect, firm H
could realise the same objective by adjusting its
products such that they were a weighted combina
tion of the outputs of C and D, the proportions
being kHC and kHD, respectively.
Since it is not viable to identify the virtual prices
for interior points, the second stage consists of
defining the MRTs of a SF from the MRTs of
the firms on the frontier. More specifically, the
response capacity of a strategic follower is calcu
lated as the linear combination of the MRs of its
Yl   
i
based on the composition of its respective activity
vector.
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otechnological reference set. For each pair of out
puts yk and yl (k, l 2 i), the MRT of a SF / is de
fined thus:
MRT/yk ;yl ¼
XS
r 1
k/r
ulr
ukr
 
¼ k/1 ul1uk1
 
þ k/2 ul2uk2
 
þ 
 
 

þ k/S ulSukS
 
; ð4Þ
where ulr and ukr indicate the virtual prices of out
puts yk and yl that satisfy program (A.2) for each
firm r, r = 1, . . . , S.
Let r* 	 r be the reference group of /; and
r 0 	 r be the rest of the firms in the sample
(r* + r 0 = r). For /, the weights that satisfy pro
gram (3) are non zero only for the firms that are
in its technological reference group, k/r*5 0
(k/r 0 = 0). Thus, expression (4) reduces to the
weighted sum of the MRTs only of those DMUs
that form part of the reference group:
MRT/yk ;yl ¼
X
8r
k/r
ulr
ukr
 
: ð5Þ
It can be seen in Fig. 3 that DMU H, situated
under the frontier, has two technological refer
ences, C and D. The position on the frontier of
these DMUs determine the inefficiency of H be
cause point H* is nothing more than a convex
combination of points C and D. For firm H, the
MRT between outputs yk and yl, MRT
H
yk ;yl
¼
ðulH=ukHÞ ¼ l, is equivalent to the weighted
sum of the marginal rates of transformation of C
and D: l¼ kHC 
MRTCyk ;yl þ kHD 
MRT
D
yk ;yl
¼ kHC

bþ kHD 
 a. Since the weight of C is greater than
the weight of D (kHC > kHD), the MRT of DMU
H is closer to C than to D.
The interpolation we propose helps to resolve
the common microeconomic problem of lack of
marginal rates for interior points. Usually, DEA
cannot distinguish between MRTs for firms shar
ing the same technological references (they are
projected on the same linear segment of the
frontier). Consequently, our approach is a new
contribution to DEA research because it allows
us to differentiate between them since eachnefficient firm is assigned to a specific MRT. Spanish banking data
.1. The sample of banks
Annual data were collected about a sample of
wo types of banks: Savings and Commercial.
ata for savings banks were collected from the
ublication ‘‘Anuario Estadı´stico de las Cajas de
horros Confederadas’’ published by ‘‘Confeder
cio´n Espan˜ola de Cajas de Ahorros’’. The data
or commercial banks were obtained from the re
ort ‘‘Anuario Estadı´stico de la Banca Privada’’
ublished by ‘‘Consejo Superior Bancario’’. Our
nitial observation was that the quality levels be
ween the two sources were diverse: the data for
avings banks were considerably better. We, there
ore, proceeded to analyse the reliability of the
ata. As a result, the final sample was reduced to
2 Commercial banks and 47 Savings banks. This
s much smaller than the original population.
here were four main reasons for exclusion: the
bsence of data (21 commercial banks and two
aving banks); the elimination of foreign banking
ranches (51 commercial banks); the presence of
nconsistent data (seven commercial banks); and
he elimination of outliers. The elimination of out
iers was executed as follows:
Outlier detection is a basic requirement prior to
ny DEA application. It is common knowledge
hat the analysis of efficiency with deterministic
odels is very sensitive to the presence of outliers
n the sample. This is due to the fact that the ex
reme points determine the efficiency frontier and
ould affect the marginal rates of the rest of the
MUs. To control for extreme observations, we
pplied an iterative process, based on Andersen
nd Petersens (1993) super efficiency coefficient.
s Wilson (1995) points out, in the output ori
nted DEA program, excluding units with low val
es of the super efficiency coefficient produces the
argest shift in the position of the frontier. Follow
ng this reasoning, we ranked units in increasing
rder of their super efficiency coefficients. This
enabled us to identify, and then remove, the DMU
with the lowest value. We then re calculated the
efficiencies and compared the two samples, i.e.
the before and the after the DMU exclusion: if
we found the difference of the efficiency coefficient
between the two samples to be statistically signifi
cant, we proceeded to remove such a unit. We then
repeated the whole process anew, and so on: the
iteration ended when the null hypothesis of equal
ity of the efficiency coefficients could not be re
jected. Evidently, our procedure is an extension
of Wilsons (1995) proposal. The final outcome
of the application of this iterative process was
the elimination of 12 banking firms (11 commer
cial banks and 1 Savings bank).
4.2. Strategic variables and marginal rates
As indicated in Section 2, we have followed the
concept of the SG defined, first, by Hofer and
Schendel (1978) and, later, applied by Cool and
Schendel (1987). Hofer and Schendel (1978, p.
25) define the strategy of a firm as ‘‘the present
and future pattern of deploying of resources and
interactions with the environment (scope of the
strategy) which indicate how the organization will
achieve its objectives’’, where ‘‘the decisions upon
scope of the strategy and deploying of resources
determine competitive advantage and synergy’’. 1
Under this definition of strategy, a SG feeds from
‘‘a set of firms competing within an industry on the
basis of similar combinations of scope and re
source commitments’’ (Cool and Schendel, 1987,
p. 1106). The decisions about scope include the
choice of the segments of the firms target market,
the product mix offered in these markets and the
geographic reach of the strategy. With regard to
the committed resources, human, material and
financial resources support the business strategy
of the firm. A firms competitive advantage is the
result of its positioning in the product market seg
ments in which it participates and of how it applies
1 The relevance of each one of the four components of the
strategy depends upon the level-corporate, business or func-
tional area of the strategy considered (Hofer and Schendel,
1978).its resources and capacities in each one of them;
and is defined as ‘‘the advantageous position of a
firm vis a` vis its competitors by means of its deci
sions over resources and/or scope’’ (Hofer and
Schendel, 1978).
Following the proposal of Hofer and Schendel
(1978), we summarize the most common varia
bles generally used in previous studies devoted
to the identification of SGs in the banking indus
try (see Walter, 1988; Mehra, 1996). With regard
to the scope of the strategy, the multi product
nature of the banking firm can be measured in
three global aspects, namely: (1) product scope,
(2) geographical reach and (3) customer proxi
mity:
(1) Product scope
This dimension of the strategy is captured by six
variables:
(S1): (commercial loans)/(financial investments).
This ratio captures a banks orientation
towards commercial banking, specialisation
in domestic economies and in small and
medium firms.
(S2): (portfolio of securities)/(financial invest
ments). This ratio determines the extent of
banking firms orientation towards active
investments in stock markets.
(S3): (liquid assets)/(financial investments). This
ratio indicates the degree of conservatism
in the banking activity (maintaining liquid
assets avoids risky investments).
(S4): (commissions due to financial services)/
(products of financial activity). Ratio
reflecting the diversification away from the
traditional banking business towards inno
vative banking focused in different services
and financial intermediation.
(S5): (Savings and deposit accounts of the private
sector)/(total liabilities). This ratio distin
guishes between the traditional and con
servative banking business, based on the
traditional accumulation of family Savings.
(S6): (net position in financial markets)/(total lia
bilities). Reflects a novel and aggressive
way of capturing funds by means of sophis
ticated formulas, such as, for instance, the
use of the interbank market.
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3(b) Geographical reach
This dimension investigates the extent of the
inter regional presence of each bank. To measure
geographical reach; we compute the Herfindahl in
dex by calculating the ratio of the number of
branches of each bank in every Spanish province
to the total number of bank branches. Formally,
the index is defined as
H ¼
X32
j 1
ðNij=NiÞ2; 0 6 H 6 1; ð6Þ
where Nij is the number of branches of the banking
firm evaluated in province j and Ni is the total
number of branches of this bank.
The specific variable used in the DEA evalua
tion is
ðS7Þ: 1 H . ð7Þ
(c) Proximity to customers
The aim of this variable is to capture differences
between commercial and saving banks. As reported
by Canals (1994), and also by Prior (2003), as a
consequence of specific regulation, Spanish savings
banks have had to constrain their ambitions of ter
ritorial expansion, until recent times. This is why
most Savings banks remain situated within their
original geographical area, in close proximity to
their customers. Obviously, this fact explains why
the dimension measuring geographical reach (S7)
generally penalizes saving banks. Nevertheless,
Savings banks have the advantage of being closer
to their domestic customers. To measure customer
proximity, a dimension is introduced by means of a
variable defined by the Herfindahl index corre
sponding to the market quota of each firm i within
each province j (j = 1, . . . , 32). More specifically,
the variable is defined as
ðS8Þ:
X32
j 1
ðNij=NjÞ2; ð8Þ
where Nij is the number of branches in province j
for the DMU under evaluation and Nj is the total
number of branches in this province.
To determine the characteristics of the inputs,
we again follow the lead of Cool and Schendel1987): We define three variables measuring a
rms commitment of physical, human and finan
ial resources:
R1) Physical capital: (depreciation and amortiza
tion expenses)/(operating income). This var
iable captures the importance of the direct
costs of fixed assets (buildings and informa
tion technology) as a percentage of the oper
ating income.
R2) Human capital: (personnel expenses)/(oper
ating income). This variable captures the
importance of human re sources as a per
centage of the operating income.
R3) Credit quality: (loan loss provisions and
write offs)/(operating income). This ratio
reflects the risk inherent in a banks strategy
and the quality of its loans.
Contrarily to Mehra (1996), we do not intro
uce any specific variable to represent the struc
ure of liabilities because the deposits and
nancing coming from the inter banking market
lready figure among the scope variables, and, as
uch, they would be redundant.
The descriptive statistics are shown in
able 1.
Once the variables measuring the scope of the
trategy and the resources committed have been
efined, the next step is to select the trade offs to
e used in the Cluster Analysis to determine the
Gs. According to the theory, the following are
he most significant trade offs that take place
mong the scope variables:
. (S1/S2) Commercial loans versus portfolio of
securities. This trade off points out the dichot
omy between commercial banking and invest
ment banking.
. (S1/S3) Commercial loans in respect to treasury.
This MRT serves to distinguish between banks
specialising in domestic economies and SMFs
from those whose investment is focused in
financial markets.
. (S3/S2) Treasury and portfolio of securities.
This is a relationship that identifies, by explor
ing the strategy of investing assets, risk taking
behaviour.
Table 1
Means, standard deviations and Pearsons correlations
Mean S.D. S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 R1 R2 R3 ROA ROE
Scope of strategy S1 0.5670 0.1944
S2 0.0534 0.0495 .125
S3 0.3837 0.1934 .968** .125
S4 0.1346 0.0870 .210* .005 .214*
S5 0.6716 0.2217 .188 .017 .189* .100
S6 0.2016 0.2186 .167 .015 .168 .091 .946**
S7 0.5153 0.3303 .011 .121 .028 .409** .190* .218*
S8 0.0643 0.1152 .057 .291** .125 .189* .162 .161 .246**
Resources R1 0.0572 0.0228 .009 .088 .032 .153 .024 .002 .172 .106
R2 0.4008 0.1092 .080 .265** .012 .174 .168 .178 .253** .084 .415**
R3 0.0432 0.0682 .058 .028 .065 .009 .226* .219* .086 .054 .160 .141
ROA 0.0056 0.0138 .126 .151 .164 .079 .202* .222* .044 .098 .302** .536** .171
ROE 0.1168 0.0896 .199* .162 .239* .103 .380** .299* .003 .261** .295** .588** .094 .615**
GP/OM 0.2504 0.2336 .039 .224 .094 .129 .246** .231* .137 .117 .581** .790** .221* .780** .736**
S1: (commercial loans)/(financial investments). S2: (portfolio of securities)/(financial investments). S3: (treasury)/(financial investments). S4: (commissions)/(products of
financial activity). S5: (Savings and deposit accounts)/(total liabilities). S6: (net position in financial markets)/(total liabilities). S7: geographical reach. S8: customers
proximity. R1: physical capital. R2: human capital. R3: credit quality. ROA: return on assets. ROE: return on equity. GP/OM: (gross profit)/(ordinary margin).
N 109.
* p < .05, two-tailed tests.
** p < .01, two-tailed tests.
D
.
P
rio
r,
J
.
S
u
rro
ca
/
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
J
o
u
rn
a
l
o
f
O
p
era
tio
n
a
l
R
esea
rch
1
7
0
(
2
0
0
6
)
2
9
3
–
3
1
4
(
o
m
s
t
c
a
w
h
o
p
i
C
a
fi
t
e
t
p
v
g
t
o
i
R
F
T
o
m
e
u4. (S5/S6) Savings and deposit accounts with
respect to financial intermediaries. This ratio
clarifies the different strategies that can be used
to raise funds.
5. (S2/S4) Investment banking vis a` vis innovative
banking. This ratio accounts for the disparity
between a specialized bank with a narrow range
of services and a diversified bank that offers a
comprehensive level of financial services.
6. (S7/S8) Geographical reach versus level of serv
ice. This captures the conflict between a strategy
of disseminating throughout the whole country
as opposed to one of focusing on a single prov
ince to achieve a greater level of proximity to
the client.
With regard to the trade offs among resources var
iables, two MRs have been chosen:
7. (R1/R2) Physical capital in relation to human
resources. This MR captures the potential
dichotomy between a capital intensive technol
ogy and a more labor intensive one.
8. (R2/R3) Human resources with respect to credit
quality. Relates the expenses due to insolvencies
with personnel expense. The rationale behind
this is that a greater investment in human capi
tal reinforces supervision, and this should be
reflected in improvements in the quality of the
operations.
4.3. Analysis
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BThe first part of the analysis was to quantify
marginal rates. This was executed by identifying
the response capacity of each firm using the meth
odology described in Section 3. Next, an array
matrix of MRT and MRS was obtained for each
institution by, initially, applying the standard
DEA program to obtain the weights followed by
the application of program (A.2) to get the mar
ginal rates of the strategic leaders. Finally, taking
into account the MRs of SLs and the activity vec
tors obtained from program (3), the MRs of SFs
(expression (5)) were computed.
Once the MRs corresponding to each DMU
were known, Cluster Analysis was performed on
the basis of the weights. As Ketchen and Shook1996) note, previous research has generally relied
n Wards method to cluster firms. However, this
ethod tends to produce clusters with roughly the
ame number of observations, with solutions that
end to be heavily distorted by outliers. To over
ome this problem, a solution, advocated in many
cademic papers (see, for instance, Punj and Ste
art, 1983), is to use a two stage process where a
ierarchical algorithm is used to define the number
f clusters. The initial results serve as the starting
oints for iterative partitioning in the second stage.
A correct identification of the number of clusters
s indispensable. Thus, multiple methods (Ward,
entroid, Median, Single Linkage, Complete Link
ge and Average Linkage) were employed in the
rst stage in order to propose different possible par
itions of the sample. From these results, two differ
nt tests were carried out. The first was a rule of
humb for selecting the number of clusters pro
osed by Harrigan (1985). Harrigans proposal in
olves the examination of the tightness of the
roups. For example, using the R2, the contribu
ion that an additional group would make to the
verall fit of the clusters is examined. The process
s iterative, the stopping rule being an increase in
2 lower than 5%. The second method we used is
iegenbaum and Thomass (1990) stopping rule:
he clusters obtained must explain at least 65%
f the overall variance, while any additional cluster
ust add less than 5% to the incremental variance
xplained. Finally, we reversed the procedure. We
sed Discriminant Analysis to calculate the per
entage of firms correctly classified in the identified
umber of groups. Together, these processes al
owed us to identify the appropriate number of
trategic groups in existence.
In the second stage, starting from the number of
dentified strategic groups, each firm was assigned
o a group using the non hierarchical K means
lgorithm. The non hierarchical K means algo
ithm has some interesting advantages over hierar
hical methods: it is less impacted by outliers and
ts final solution optimizes within clusters homoge
eity and between clusters heterogeneity (Ketchen
nd Shook, 1996). However, the K means algo
ithm has an important shortcoming: It requires
hat the number of clusters be specified a priori.
ut, in our case, this has already been solved.
Finally, to examine whether differences in the
selected dimensions exist among the identified
SGs, a MANOVA was carried out. Differences
among groups for each variable were verified using
ANOVA. Additionally, we used Discriminant
Analysis to give robustness to our segmentation
of the sample.
5. Strategic groups in Spanish banking industry
5.1. Strategic groups based on marginal rates
Cluster Analysis results suggested that the sam
ple should be divided into five strategic groups, asTable 2
Characterization of strategic groups based on marginal rates result
MANOVA; F(Wilks) 21.150 (p 0.000)
Discriminant Analysis correctly classifies 89.9% of the sample
Strategic groups
1 2 3 4
S1/S2 2.1096 0.9580 1.6384 1
(0.7971) (0.5683) (0.4645) (
S3/S1 9.6806 1.2872 3.5642 2
(2.4085) (0.8744) (1.1232) (
S3/S2 2.3368 1.1042 1.3240 1
(1.2862) (0.8996) (0.5534) (
S6/S5 2.1687 0.9446 1.9381 4
(0.9928) (0.6139) (0.6879) (
S4/S2 1.9102 0.8683 1.5384 1
(0.8685) (0.4589) (0.3770) (
S8/S7 1.7287 1.0113 1.6674 1
(0.7798) (1.0956) (0.8861) (
R1/R2 3.7487 1.2360 2.9580 1
(1.4311) (0.8207) (0.7203) (
R3/R2 4.1491 1.2312 3.1337 1
(1.7492) (0.8255) (1.1734) (
ROA 0.0007 0.0083 0.0078 0
(0.0082) (0.0054) (0.0071) (
ROE 0.0496 0.1509 0.1137 0
(0.0977) (0.0820) (0.0687) (
GP/OM 0.0824 0.3177 0.2766 0
(0.4986) (0.1345) (0.1586) (
# DMUs 6 26 36 2
Commercial banks 6 19 19 3
Savings banks 7 17 2
Standard deviations are seen in parentheses.
S1: (commercial loans)/(financial investments). S2: (portfolio of sec
ments). S4: (commissions)/(products of financial activity). S5: (Savin
financial markets)/(total liabilities). S7: geographical reach. S8: cust
credit quality. ROA: return on assets. ROE: return on equity. GP/Oshown in Table 2. The detailed composition of the
groups can be found in Appendix B.
Inspection of the centroids of each SG reveals
that, generally, SG2 has the lowest ratios, indicat
ing lower costs of strategy change. This result is
reasonable when we look at the type of firms that
make up the group: they are principally large
banks and large Savings banks, which conform
to the model of universal banking and have greater
capacity to change their strategies.
At the other extreme, SG1 and SG5 (specialized
banking) have greater restrictions on changing
their strategy in that they face greater costs of
change. For SG1, the greater cost of change froms of the MANOVA, ANOVA and Discriminant Analyses
ANOVA
5 Total F test p-Value
.4001 2.1156 1.5174 16.553 0.000
0.3653) (0.5441) (0.6331)
.5602 3.3766 3.0999 57.257 0.000
1.4628) (1.1701) (2.2063)
.4957 1.8613 1.4456 6.437 0.000
0.2718) (0.5203) (0.7214)
.7350 2.6387 2.4581 55.386 0.000
1.4310) (0.9588) (1.6493)
.3891 2.0121 1.4343 19.654 0.000
0.2460) (0.5775) (0.5769)
.6158 5.1023 2.0067 47.060 0.000
0.9778) (1.1582) (1.6418)
.4763 3.7971 2.3741 37.213 0.000
0.7474) (1.0983) (1.3144)
.4847 3.8330 2.4602 29.182 0.000
0.7404) (1.1306) (1.4892)
.0081 0.0060 0.0056 8.150 0.000
0.0062) (0.0303) (0.0138)
.1497 0.0422 0.1168 6.502 0.000
0.0827) (0.0996) (0.0896)
.3146 0.0448 0.2504 5.908 0.000
0.1470) (0.3373) (0.2336)
5 16 109
15 62
2 1 47
urities)/(financial investments). S3: (treasury)/(financial invest-
gs and deposit accounts)/(total liabilities). S6: (net position in
omers proximity. R1: physical capital. R2: human capital. R3:
M: (gross profit)/ordinary margin).
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bcommercial loans to treasury (high S3/S1 trade
off) indicates that this group places higher value
on strategies oriented towards domestic economies
and SMEs than on avoiding risk and saving on
operating costs. SG1 places the greatest value on
the trade off between treasury and portfolio of
securities (S3/S2) than the other groups, reaffirm
ing a risk taking approach. Further still, it is unli
kely that SG1 can change its strategy from
investment banking (S2) to commercial banking
(S1) because for every reduction of one monetary
unit in their stocks portfolio, there are important
compensations in terms of loans. In other words,
for SG1, investments in securities are more valua
ble than money lending. This group also has the
greatest costs of strategy change from commercial
loans (S1) to treasury (S3), from portfolio of secu
rities (S2) to treasury (S3), from human resources
(R2) to production technology (R1) and from hu
man resources (R2) to credit quality (R3). Due to
the last trade off, this cluster could be labeled as
risky banking. Its high valuation of human capital
reinforces this business orientation, as we can see
from the trade offs from physical capital (R1) to
human capital (R2), and also, from credit quality
(R3) to human capital (R2).
SG5 can be labeled as wholesale banking. It is
characterized by a focus on geographical reach
rather than concentration in a single province
(high S7/S8 ratio). It also has the greatest costs
of strategy change between the following pairs of
the variables: commercial loans (S1) to portfolio
of securities (S2), commissions (S4) to portfolio
of securities (S2) and productive technology (R1)
to human resources (R2). These ratios suggest that
SG5 values a strategy of security investment (S1)
more than one of specializing in domestic econo
mies and in SMEs (S2); and also more than the
usual diversification of traditional banking (S4).
SG3 and SG4 are in an intermediate situation
with regard to the costs of strategy change. Never
theless, it is worth noting the difficulties that SG4
faces to switch between traditional liabilities (S5)
and financial intermediaries (S6) an understand
able situation because this group is basically com
posed of Savings banks where Savings and deposit
accounts play a dominant role in the composition
of liabilities. Thus, SG4 can be labeled as tradiional Savings banks. Finally, we can refer to the
G3 as generalist banking.
When we relate the capacity or costs of strategy
hange to the indicators of results, we observe that
he SGs experiencing the greatest difficulties in
ttempting to change the orientation of their strat
gies have, simultaneously, the worse results. At
he opposite extreme SG2, which had the greatest
exibility in the orientation of its strategy, also en
oys the best results. This observation holds no
atter which indicator we use.
.2. Strategic groups based on Cluster Analysis
f original decision variables
Our aim now is to compare the SGs obtained
hrough the proposed method with those obtained
rom the traditional application of Cluster Analy
is on the original strategic variables as this allows
s to establish how well each method performs in
etermining market segmentation.
Using the previously defined two stage proce
ure, Cluster Analysis was applied to the original
trategic variables. The results are presented in
able 3, while the composition of SGs is tabulated
n Appendix B. A MANOVA and a Discriminant
nalysis were carried out to examine the models
bility to separate the observations. Additionally,
NOVA analysis was used to test the significance
f the strategic variables among the proposed stra
egic groups. As can be seen, a six cluster solution
as obtained.
Allow us now to comment briefly on the results
btained. SG1 represents commercial banking,
ncluding the largest Spanish banking firms. They
ave a broad branch network, emphasizing their
ocus on retail banking. However, these firms are
niversal banks and it is not surprising that they
lso have some business in wholesale banking
for example, portfolio of securities). SG1 is char
cterized by a focus on commercial loans, obtain
ng funds from the interbanking market.
The banks in SG2 are characterised by innova
ive banking. The firms in this group have a very
igh proportion of earnings from financial services
ather than from loans or investments.
SG3 appears to be oriented towards wholesale
anking. It is characterized by a focus on attracting
funds by means of sophisticated formulas and func
tioning as a resource to the interbankingmarket.We
also find foreign banks, in SG3, that have a poor
on securities investments and on treasury. Where
the strategy about liabilities is concerned, SG4
banks capture funds using aggressive sophisticated
Table 3
Characterization of strategic groups based on cluster analysis of original decision variables results of the MANOVA, ANOVA and
Discriminant Analyses
MANOVA; F(Wilks) 2.942 (p 0.000)
Discriminant Analysis correctly classifies 95.6% of the sample
Strategic groups ANOVA
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total F test p-Value
S1 0.482 0.320 0.817 0.428 0.708 0.528 0.567 15.179 0.000
(0.151) (0.106) (0.132) (0.357) (0.090) (0.188) (0.194)
S2 0.060 0.037 0.027 0.113 0.041 0.064 0.053 2.237 0.056
(0.065) (0.038) (0.029) (0.091) (0.033) (0.045) (0.049)
S3 0.464 0.648 0.166 0.459 0.255 0.410 0.384 12.663 0.000
(0.156) (0.117) (0.133) (0.447) (0.084) (0.186) (0.193)
S4 0.198 0.179 0.079 0.026 0.131 0.091 0.135 8.221 0.000
(0.114) (0.106) (0.082) (0.017) (0.054) (0.038) (0.087)
S5 0.686 0.302 0.139 0.069 0.769 0.769 0.672 60.250 0.000
(0.104) (0.141) (0.139) (0.077) (0.089) (0.138) (0.222)
S6 0.196 0.584 0.661 0.858 0.111 0.091 0.202 69.811 0.000
(0.107) (0.145) (0.268) (0.073) (0.087) (0.089) (0.219)
S7 0.836 0.830 0.790 0.000 0.570 0.119 0.515 101.943 0.000
(0.105) (0.108) (0.115) (0.000) (0.180) (0.124) (0.330)
S8 0.120 0.024 8.7E 5 9.8E 8 0.064 0.042 0.064 2.239 0.056
(0.178) (0.067) (1.6E 4) (8.5E 8) (0.104) (0.047) (0.115)
R1 0.061 0.072 0.072 0.023 0.056 0.053 0.057 3.139 0.011
(0.016) (0.021) (0.073) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023)
R2 0.406 0.507 0.439 0.349 0.415 0.355 0.401 3.345 0.008
(0.086) (0.106) (0.182) (0.172) (0.093) (0.112) (0.109)
R3 0.040 0.098 0.047 0.053 0.044 0.030 0.043 1.299 0.270
(0.032) (0.180) (0.114) (0.019) (0.046) (0.059) (0.068)
ROA 0.0063 0.0003 0.0024 0.0040 0.0067 0.0063 0.0056 0.642 0.668
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0078) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0230) (0.0138)
ROE 0.1348 0.0368 0.0448 0.0445 0.1221 0.1316 0.1168 2.816 0.020
(0.0863) (0.0769) (0.1480) (0.0552) (0.0817) (0.0860) (0.0896)
GP/OM 0.2617 0.0781 0.0393 0.2782 0.2496 0.3184 0.2504 2.900 0.017
(0.1206) (0.1543) (0.5511) (0.3694) (0.1518) (0.2925) (0.2336)
# DMUs 27 8 4 3 35 32 109
Commercial banks 19 8 4 3 18 8 62
Savings banks 6 17 24 47
Standard deviations are seen in parentheses.
S1: (commercial loans)/(financial investments). S2: (portfolio of securities)/(financial investments). S3: (treasury)/(financial invest-
ments). S4: (commissions)/(products of financial activity). S5: (Savings and deposit accounts)/(total liabilities). S6: (net position in
financial markets)/(total liabilities). S7: geographical reach. S8: customers proximity. R1: physical capital. R2: human capital. R3:
credit quality. ROA: return on assets. ROE: return on equity. GP/OM: (gross profit)/ordinary margin).market quota despite a broad geographical reach,
a patternpossibly following the lead of foreign firms.
The key feature of SG4 is investment banking.
Rather than commercial loans, this SG is focusedformulas. They are also sparsely spread across
geographical markets.
The orientation in SG5 is intermediation bank
ing: SG5members generally capture funds through
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otraditional and conservative formulas (Savings
and deposit accounts of the private sector), which
they then convert into commercial loans. This is,
clearly, a low risk strategy.
Finally, SG6 clusters small Savings banks,
where Savings and deposits accounts occupy a
dominant place. Furthermore, other key charac
teristics of their strategy are high security invest
ments most likely in SMEs, some commercial
activity and treasury endowments and no risk.
The firms in this group are small, both in physical
and human capital terms.
From the point of view of the performance
group membership linkage, a look at the results
in Table 3 suggests that there are no substantial
performance differentials across groups. More spe
cifically, the ANOVA test shows that groups
formed by clustering on the original variables do
not exhibit significant differences for the ROA (re
turn on assets). In contrast, for the ROE (return
on equity) and the GP/OM (gross profit/ordinary
margin), the group differences are significant at
the 5% level.
5.3. Performance analysis
Strategic group theory suggests that long last
ing firm profitability derives from the structure of
the industry and that strategic group membership
is the primary source of persistent differences in
the performance of firms. Our goal here is to
examine the extent of statistical association be
tween group membership and performance indica
tors. A univariate ANOVA test was conducted to
examine the association between structure of the
industry and the performance of firms. To study
Table 4
2ANOVA: R fit for individual performance measures
SGs based on marginal rates
SGs based on cluster strategic variables (scope and resources) MO
MO
The significance level of the F values is shown in parentheses.
(GP)/(OM): Gross profit/Ordinary margin.he extent of the variability of the indicators that
ould be explained by strategic group membership,
2 tests were computed for each performance
ndicator.
Following Mehras (1996), we verify in this sec
ion how much better our proposal of determining
Gs having started from MRs is at explaining the
ariability of results than the ‘‘traditional’’ appli
ation of Cluster Analysis to the initial strategic
ariables. The results of this comparison can be
ound in Table 4. To be able to compare the seg
entations from both methods, we recalculated
he six cluster solution obtained from the original
trategic variables clustering (model 2B in Table
) in order to impose a division of the sample into
ve different groups. Model 2A in Table 4 contains
he results obtained.
From Table 4, it is evident that SGs based on
arginal rates show significant differences across
he three performance indicators: the clusters ex
lain almost 21% of the ROA variance, nearly
7% of ROE variance, and upwards of 15% of
he productivity ratio (gross profit/ordinary mar
in) variance. On the other hand, the capacity of
Gs based on clustering on the original variables
o explain the variability of the sample depends
n the indicator chosen and on the number of clus
ers considered. Specifically, the five group solu
ion is only significant across one of the
erformance measures, and only at the 10% level.
owever, when six clusters are considered, the
roups are significantly different across all per
ormance dimensions, although the SGs capacity
o explain performance differences between
roups is still lower than strategic groups based
n MRs.ROA ROE (GP)/(OM)
0.209 0.169 0.154
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DEL 2A (5 SGs) 0.042 0.018 0.012
(0.077) (0.212) (0.263)
DEL 2B (6 SGs) 0.141 0.078 0.081
(0.001) (0.020) (0.017)
The general conclusion that can be drawn from
the results shown in Table 4 is that, if one of the
requisites for accepting the notion of SG is
the ability to explain differences in results (say,
the association between group membership and
performance), then the segmentation of banking
firms as a function of their strategic response
capacity (MRs) exhibits a stronger fit. In other
words, SGs based on MRs explain a higher per
centage of intra industry performance variance
than those obtained from the standard application
of Cluster Analysis on the initial variables.
These results reflect a positive relation between
the response capacity of banks and superior per
formance. A joint analysis of SG characteristics
and results clearly reveals that firms with lower
cost of strategy change (i.e., low marginal rates)
enjoy competitive advantage. This case is very well
represented by SG2.6. Conclusions
The concept of a strategic group has merited a
great deal of attention within the strategic manage
ment and industrial organization literature
(McGee and Thomas, 1986). Explaining differ
ences in the performance of firms is a fundamental
goal of both of these types of literature. Yet still,
there is debate in the literature about how strategic
groups should be identified (Fiegenbaum and Tho
mas, 1990). To address this uncertainty, this study
has developed a framework for identifying SGs,
and has then applied the framework to test
whether the hypothesis of no differences in per
formance across groups can be supported. The
paper has also proved empirically that this
framework has a greater ability to explain intra
industry performance differences than the tradi
tional analysis.
Our main objective is to find a way to take into
account inefficiency when classifying firms into
SGs. The basic proposition of this paper is that
firms use given inputs in order to achieve certain
results, and do so following different strategies.
From this, it follows that firms in the same group
convert inputs into outputs in the same way, and
consequently, an SG can be defined as a set offirms that value inputs and outputs in the same
way. In this context, DEA is an excellent tool for
segmentation. There are two main reasons to sup
port this assertion. First, using DEA efficiency
scores calculated for each DMU, comparisons
can be made between firms that use similar in
puts outputs mix. Second, differences in strategies
imply differences in the importance attached to
key decision variables. These differences can be
perfectly captured through DEA weights. But,
usually, there is a problem with DEA weights.
They exhibit multiplicity. We have, however,
shown in this paper how this limitation can be re
solved. Another problem is that weights cannot be
computed for inefficient firms because they are in
the interior of the production possibility set
(Cooper et al., 2000). This problem can, however,
be easily overcome by using interpolation and
assigning a linear combination of efficient firms
weights to the inefficient ones.
We have been able to test the proposed method
through an empirical study of the Spanish banking
industry. First, DEA was used to identify the stra
tegic leaders (firms lying on the frontier) and to
quantify the MRs, which indicate the relative
importance of weights with respect to the key deci
sion variables. Then, Cluster Analysis was used
to group the banks on the basis of the MRs.
Finally, statistical tests were employed to investi
gate whether any differences in the performance
and decision variables are present between the
firms.
The results confirmed the potential contribution
of our proposal towards a better understanding of
the characteristics of SGs. To verify this, we stud
ied the strategic groups defined to observe the
presence of efficient banks and also for their ability
to maximize between group differences. Differ
ences between SGs were identified for all the spec
ified performance indicators. In order to increase
our knowledge about the properties of our pro
posal, we compared the SGs composition we had
obtained with the one obtained in the traditional
way of Cluster Analysis based directly on the stra
tegic variables. The results state clearly that the
segmentation made on the basis of MRs exhibits
a stronger fit because it explains a more substantial
percentage of intra industry performance variance.
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wSumming up, on the one hand, the SGs
obtained using the MRs are very different from
those obtained from clustering on the original
strategic variables. This empirical evidence sug
gests that, for the identification of clusters, it is
not just the decisions on the product market
dimension that are important but also the relative
importance given to these decisions. On the other
hand, our proposal is concurrent with very recent
literature devoted to the definition of SGs. We
now present two examples to clarify this. First,
following the cognitive perspective, it is necessary
to consider the managers perspectives on how
some firms follow similar strategies (Fombrun
and Zajac, 1987). In our specific case, the weights
system determines for each firm how managers
value their key strategic variables. Thus, firms
sharing similar valuation systems determine the
configuration of SGs. Second, following the re
sources perspective; SGs have to be defined as
clusters of firms with similar resources configura
tion (Mehra, 1996). Our proposal incorporates
the existing relationship between inputs and out
puts to define SGs.
MRs provide precise information about the
preferences over decision variables made by a
group of DMUs. Obviously, it is possible to antic
ipate changes in a firms strategy, but these
changes are not necessarily congruent with per
formance maximization: if two firms use inputs
and outputs in a very different way (say, they be
long to separate SGs) and both groups show desir
able performance, the convergence between groups
never occurs. This explains two usual occurrences:
(1) why some firms in an industry achieve greater
profits than others; and (2) why firms maintain dif
ferent strategies in spite of trying to move to other,
apparently more successful, strategies. We can
interpret the lack of convergence between groups
as a sign of the presence of barriers to mobility.
As Hatten and Hatten (1987) pointed out, barriers
to mobility should be understood as the costs asso
ciated with an eventual change of SG, and such
costs should be compared to the potential profits.
A preliminary approximation of how important
these barriers are in the Spanish banking industry
suggests that the performance differences between
firms are going to be maintained. The frameworkroposed in this research opens a new line in the
entification of barriers to mobility in the litera
ure of SGs. We hope to extend it in the nearppendix A
Following Rosen et al. (1998) program (2) is
nearized with a change of variables, qw = (vw/
k); (qk = 1):
Rþk;l ¼ Maxq ql ðMR

k;l ¼ MinqqlÞ
.t. qk ¼ 1;
zT/q ¼ 0;
zTp q 6 0; ðA:1Þ
ut it is possible that the solution of program (A.1)
ould be q =1 (q = 0 in the case of minimiza
ion). Given that in our proposal it is important
o obtain bounded and non null MRs, we added
ome additional restrictions that, without altering
rogram (A.1), offered bounded solutions (Sueyo
hi et al., 1999, present an alternative proposal to
he measurement of upper and lower bounds in
he general case of multiple solutions). That was
ossible redefining Rosen et al. (1998) program
dding new restrictions:
Rþk;l ¼ Maxq;d ql ðMR

k;l ¼ Minq;dqlÞ
.t. qk ¼ 1;
zT/q ¼ 0;
zTp q 6 0;
ql P qk þ d;
qk P qkþ1 þ d;
. . .
qM1 P qM þ d;
d > 0. ðA:2Þ
Maintaining the original program of Rosen
t al. (1998), the restrictions added provide
ounded solutions (strictly positive in the case of
inimization) upon establishing the requirement
f equal distance separating successive virtual
eights.
Appendix B. Composition of strategic groups based on marginal rates (vertical) and on cluster original variables (horizontal)
Strategic groups based on marginal rates
Strategic
group 1
Strategic
group 2
Strategic
group 3
Strategic
group 4
Strategic
group 5
Strategic
groups based
on cluster
original decision
variables
SG 1 BANCO
ATLANTICO
1 BANCOVAL 1 Caja Duero 1 BANCO
GUIPUZCOANO
1
BANCO ESPAN˜OL
DE CREDITO
1 BANKPYME 1 BANCO
PASTOR
1 BANCO DEL
COMERCIO
1
BBV PRIVANZA
BANCO
1 BANCO
DE VITORIA
1 C.A. de
GALICIA
1 BANCO
DESARROLLO
EC
1
BANCO
CENTRAL
HISPANO
1 BANKOA 1 CAJA ESPAN˜A
de Inversiones
1 SOLBANK SBD 1
BANCO
INVERSION
1 BANCO
GALLEGO
1
BANCO
SABADELL
1 BANCO
ZARAGOZANO
1
BANCO
URQUIJO
1
BANCO
BILBAO
VIZCAYA
1
BANCO
POPULAR
ESPAN˜OL
1
BANKINTER 1
C.A. y M.P.
de MADRID
1
Ibercaja 1
La Caixa 1
SG2 BANCO
SANTANDER
NEGOCIOS
2 B.N.P.
ESPAN˜A
2 BANCO LUSO
ESPAN˜OL
2
BARCLAYS
BANK
2 BANCO
ESPIRITO
SANTO
2
BANCO BANIF 2 BANCO
ARABE
ESPAN˜OL
2
BANCO
SANTANDER
2
SG3 DEUTSCHE
BANK CREDIT
3 FINANZIA 3 CITIBANK
ESPAN˜A
3
HALIFAX
HISPANIA
3
(continued on next page)
Appendix B (continued)
Strategic groups based on marginal rates
Strategic
group 1
Strategic
group 2
Strategic
group 3
Strategic
group 4
Strategic
group 5
SG4 PROBANCA 4 BANCO
COOPERATIVO
ESPAN˜OL
4
DEXIA
BANCO LOCAL
4
SG5 BANCO DE
VASCONIA
5 BANCA
MARCH
5 C.E. de
TARRAGONA
5 C.E. de
SABADELL
5
BANCO DE
GALICIA
5 BANCO
DE ALICANTE
5 C.E. de
TERRASSA
5 BANCA
CATALANA
5
C.A. Municipal
de VIGO
5 C.A. y M.P.
de SEGOVIA
5 BANCO
HERRERO
5 BANCO
SIMEON
5
C.E. del PENEDE´S 5 BANCA JOVER 5 BANCO
MAPFRE
5
BANCO
DE ANDALUCIA
5 C.A. de
CATALUNYA
5 CREDIT
LYONNAIS ESP.
5
BANCO
DE MURCIA
5 CajaSur 5
SIND. BAN.
BARCELONA
5 C.A. de
MURCIA
5
BANCO DE
EXTREMADURA
5 BANCAJA 5
BANCO DE
VALENCIA
5 C.A. del
MEDITERRA´NEO
5
BANCO DE
ASTURIAS
5 UNICAJA 5
BANCOFAR 5 C.A. de
CASTILLA
MANCHA
5
EUROBANK
MEDITERRAN.
5
C. General de A.
GRANADA
5
C.A. Provincial
PONTEVEDRA
5
CAJA SAN
FERNANDO
5
M.P. y C.A. HUEL.
SEVILLA
5
SG6 BANCO
UNIVERSAL
6 BANCO DIRECTO 6 BANCO
CONDAL
6 M.P. y C. General
de BADAJOZ
6 OPEN BANK 6
SDAD.ESP.BAN.
NEGOCIOS
6 C.A. y M.P. del
C.C.O. de BURGOS
6 BANCO
ETCHEVERRIA
6 C.E. de GIRONA 6
C.A. Municipal
de BURGOS
6 BANCA
PUEYO
6 C.A. de ASTURIAS 6
Caja Vital 6 BANCO
ALCALA
6 C.A. y M.P.
de las BALEARES
6
C.A. y Pre´stamos
de CARLET
6 C.A. de NAVARRA 6
C.A. Prov.
GUADALAJARA
6 C. General de A.
de CANARIAS
6
C.A. de LA RIOJA 6 C.A. de
SANTANDER-
CANT
6
C.E. de MANRESA 6 BILBAO BIZKAIA
KUTXA
6
C.E. LAIETANA 6 C.A. y M.P.
de EXTREMADURA
6
C.A. y M.P
de ONTINYENT
6 C.A. GIPUZ.
SAN SEBAS
6
C.A. Provincial
de ORENSE
6
C.A. y M.P. Mun.
PAMPLONA
6
C.A. de POLLENC¸A 6
C.A. de la INMA.
ARAGO´N
6
C. Provincial
de A. de JAE´N
6
In bold are shown the strategic leaders.
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